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HUMAN DIGNITY FIRST:
JOHN PAUL II, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND
THE ERISA FIDUCIARY
ALISON MCMORRAN SULENTICt
I wish to appeal with simplicity and humility to everyone, to all
men and women without exception. I wish to ask them to be
convinced of the seriousness of the present moment and of each
one's individual responsibility, and to implement-by the way
they live as individuals and as families, by the use of their
resources, by their civic activity, by contributing to economic
and political decisions, and by personal commitment to national
and international undertakings-the measures inspired by
solidarity and love of preference for the poor. This is what is
demanded by the present moment and above all by the very
dignity of the human person, the indestructible image of God
the Creator, which is identical in each one of us.1
The council exhorts Christians. .. to perform their duties
faithfully in the spirit of the Gospel. It is a mistake to think
that... we are entitled to evade our earthly responsibilities; this
is to forget that because of our faith we are all the more
bound to fulfill these responsibilities according to each one's
vocation.... Let Christians follow the example of Christ who
worked as a craftsman; let them be proud of the opportunity to
carry out their earthly activity in such a way as to integrate
human, domestic, professional, scientific and technical
enterprises with religious values, under whose supreme direction
all things are ordered to the glory of God.
2
t Associate Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law; J.D., Harvard
Law School (1989). The research for this article was supported by a summer writing
grant from Duquesne University School of Law. The author thanks Susan Stabile for
her comments and Jacki Mirowitz and Sarah Andrews for research assistance. I am
also grateful to Michael Simons and Susan Stabile of St. John's University School of
Law for the opportunity to present these ideas at the March 2006 conference on The
Jurisprudential Legacy of John Paul I.
1 JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLIcAL LETTER SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS 47 (1987).
2 PAUL VI, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION GAUDIUM ET SPES 43 (1965).
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The papal encyclicals at the core of Catholic social thought
abound with theoretical insights concerning the moral
development and economic well-being of a nation and its
individual citizens. Yet, the encyclicals speak to the universal
church in language that is deliberately general. 3 This convention
implicitly requires each individual and each community to
implement the core values of Catholic social thought in the
context of its local economic, legal and cultural norms.4 This is
an extraordinary challenge: how does a theologically grounded
ethical mandate in social relations become workable public policy
or a pragmatic business strategy?
Putting Catholic social thought into practice requires the
understanding of empirical reality and legal constraints that is
the bread and butter of lawyer's work. Articulating a practical
plan to implement theoretical insights is not the most glamorous
contribution to the perfection of the temporal order. But it is,
nonetheless, lawyer's work-pragmatic, purposeful and steeped
in the reality of human lives. As legal scholars, then, our
potential contribution to the lively discussion between
theologians, social scientists and activists is eminently practical.
Moreover, the modern legal scholar generally enjoys the benefit
of several years' experience in the practice of law. These
formative years offer a time to hone the analytical skills
particular to lawyering by assisting clients to create and follow
3 See Kenneth R. Himes, Introduction to MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING:
COMMENTARIES AND INTERPRETATIONS 1, 5 (Kenneth R. Himes ed., 2005)
[hereinafter MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING] ("The teaching does not delve
into the specifics of proposed solutions but functions more at the level of values and
perspectives by which to frame discussion of a problem and understand what is at
stake.").
4 In Laborem Exercens, for example, John Paul II articulates the "special
significance" of proposed strategies to correct the imbalance between labor and
capital. John Paul II describes a variety of proposals without elaborating or
mandating a specific reform:
Whether these various proposals can or cannot be applied concretely, it is
clear that recognition of the proper position of labor and the worker in the
production process demands various adaptations in the sphere of the right
to ownership of the means of production.
JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER LABOREM EXERCENS 14 (1981) [hereinafter
LABOREMEXERCENS].
The Pope's reference to the "concrete application" of proposals suggests his
appreciation of the need to test and confirm different methods to put theory into
practice. See id.; see also Patricia A. Lamoureux, Commentary on Laborem Exercens
(On Human Work), in MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING, supra note 3, at 389,
394.
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business plans, to make arrangements to organize and sustain
their family lives and to resolve disputes with their neighbors or
business associates.5 Like theologians and policy analysts, we
may revel in the discussion of why a particular end is desirable
or a particular premise flawed, but the lawyer ultimately
gravitates to the practical question of how to achieve that end or
how to correct the flaw.
This Article considers the challenge to design a workplace
compensation structure that maximizes human dignity, a core
value of Catholic social thought. In particular, I compare two
different compensation systems-first, a compensation
arrangement designed to contribute to the overall maximization
of the employer's profits and, second, an arrangement grounded
in a specifically Catholic concept of human dignity. The
particular focus of this comparison is the conditions for fiduciary
decision-making with regard to employee benefit plans that are
subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"). I argue that an employer's decision to act both as
settlor and as fiduciary of an employee benefit plan (a decision
that is plainly legitimate under ERISA) may be the first step
towards compromising the fiduciary decision-making process
and, thus, is potentially at odds with the goal of enhancing
human dignity.
Part One of this Article discusses John Paul II's
understanding of the role of work in promoting human dignity.
Part Two examines the particular role of the fiduciary in light of
John Paul II's concept of the "indirect employer." Part Three
draws on the systems approach, a methodology borrowed from
computer sciences and organizational theory to enable social
scientists to describe complex, interlocking systems, in order to
convey the differences between a variety of workplace
compensation arrangements. Part Four provides a practical
example of the manner in which an employer's decision to
appoint an independent fiduciary might result in a workplace
5 In 1891, Leo XIII's famous encyclical, Rerum Novarum, ushered in a renewed
awareness of the Church's social teaching. See generally LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL
LETTER RERUM NOVARUM (1891) [hereinafter RERUM NOVARUM]. Spurred on by the
early social encyclicals and the documents of the Second Vatican Council, twentieth-
century historians, economists, and sociologists brought their analytical disciplines
to bear on our understanding of the Church's response to the "social question."
2006]
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compensation arrangement better suited to enhancing human
dignity in the administration of an employee benefit plan.
I. JOHN PAUL II AND COMPENSATION
John Paul II's vision of a just workplace is rooted in
Christian personalism. 6 John Paul II repeatedly stated that the
human person is created in the image and likeness of God.7 Call
it what you will-premise, insight, truth-this proposition places
the well-being of the human person at the center of every system
of economic and social relationships.
John Paul II's written works demonstrate a profound and
consistent commitment to the dignity of the human person. He
consistently presented the human person both as an individual
with unique talents and concerns and as a person living in
community with others and in proximity to the physical world.
The particular importance of the human person in the workplace
was a theme dear to the Pope, and he found numerous occasions
to speak and write of the role of work in personal development,
as well as in the general economy.8 His writings capture the
importance of the work experience in bringing the worker to the
realization of the fullness of his existence and his potential as a
human person.9 His understanding of work and its psychological,
physical and spiritual impact on the human person reflected the
extraordinary breadth of his own work experiences. It is well
known that the John Paul II's subjective understanding of the
worker and workplace relationships was the fruit of an unlikely
combination of skills and experiences that included waiting
restaurant tables, writing plays and poetry, handling explosives
6 For a succinct explanation of personalism, see Judith A. Merkle, Personalism,
in THE NEW DICTIONARY OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 737, 737-38 (Judith A.
Dwyer ed., 1994) [hereinafter NEW DICTIONARY].
7 See id. at 4; Lamoureux, supra note 4, at 390-91 (noting John Paul II's use of
this theme in early trips to Poland and Mexico).
8 John Dwyer explains the centrality of this concern as follows:
[H]uman dignity is inseparable from the person, and it does not depend for
its reality on being acknowledged by others, whether by individuals or by
the state; rather, it demands such recognition and acknowledgment.
Human dignity is simply the existence of the individual man or woman,
viewed from a certain perspective-viewed, that is, as constituting a task
and a challenge for the existing person and as imposing certain obligations
on other individuals and communities.
John C. Dwyer, Dignity of Person, in NEW DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 724, 729.
9 See LABOREMEXERCENS, supra note 4, 26.
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in a mine quarry and engaging in university life as a pastor, a
teacher and a scholar. 10
Although John Paul II certainly did not downplay the toll
that an unjust work environment could exact upon an ill-treated
laborer, his vision of work was fundamentally positive." John
Paul II's Eden was a place where people worked. Naming the
animals, tilling the soil and subduing the earth were all activities
"for man to carry out in the world."'1 2 The particular privilege of
human beings is to share in the creative energy of the Creator by
consciously "discover[ing] and us[ing]" the resources of the earth
and the visible world. 13 The universality of work as the "very
deepest essence"' 4 of human activity extended to Jesus, as the
incarnation of God. In Laborem Exercens, the Pope described
Gospel accounts of Jesus' manual labor as "showing that the
basis for determining the value of human work is not primarily
the kind of work being done but the fact that the one who is
doing it is a person."'15 In John Paul II's view, therefore, the
common humanity of workers at all levels of production
contradicts any pretense to differentiate the moral value of work
by reference to external markers of productivity, market value or
cultural prestige.1 6
10 See GEORGE WEIGEL, WITNESS TO HOPE: THE BIOGRAPHY OF POPE JOHN
PAUL II 53-58, 89-108, 112-19,
123-39 (1999); CARL BERNSTEIN & MARCO POLITI, HIS HOLINESS: JOHN PAUL II AND
THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF OUR TIME 51, 54-56 (1996); Lamoureux, supra note 4, at
392.
11 John Paul II wrote that:
[Various ideological or power systems and new relationships which have
arisen at various levels of society have allowed flagrant injustices to persist
or have created new ones. On the world level, the development of
civilization and of communications has made possible a more complete
diagnosis of the living and working conditions of man globally, but it has
also revealed other forms of injustice much more extensive than those
which in the last century stimulated unity between workers for particular
solidarity in the working world.
LABOREMEXERCENS, supra note 4, 8; see also Lamoureux, supra note 4, at 390.
12 LABOREMEXERCENS, supra note 4, 4.
13 Id.; see also id. 25.
14 Id. 4.
15 Id. 6; see also id. 26.
16 See id. 6.
Given this way of understanding things and presupposing that different
sorts of work that people do can have greater or lesser objective value, let
us try nevertheless to show that each sort is judged above all by the
measure of the dignity of the subject of work, that is to say the person, the
individual who carries it out.
2006]
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John Paul II understood work to include both objective and
subjective attributes. 17 In Laborem Exercens, he explained that
work "embraces all human beings, every generation, every phase
of economic and cultural development, and at the same time it is
a process that takes place within each human being, in each
conscious human subject."' 8 Used in the objective sense, work is
"a 'transitive' activity, that is to say an activity beginning in the
human subject and directed toward an external object."'19
However, the human person is also the subject of work and
experiences the transformative effect of work in his or her
personal development. Laborem Exercens states:
Man has to subdue the earth and dominate it, because as the
'image of God' he is a person, that is to say, a subjective being
capable of acting in a planned and rational way, capable of
deciding about himself, and with a tendency to self-realization.
As a person, man is therefore the subject of work. As a person
he works, he performs various actions belonging to the work
process; independently of their objective content, these actions
must all serve to realize his humanity, to fulfill the calling to be
a person that is his by reason of his very humanity. 20
In other words, the accomplishment of a particular task fulfills
the objective purpose of work ("subduing the earth"), while the
subjective process and experience of work similarly transform
and enhance the worker. 2' John Paul II consistently emphasized
the transformative impact of work on the human person. As the
means to "self-realization" and to "fulfill[ing] the calling to be a
person," the subjective dimension of work is always the most
important.22
John Paul II's conceptual understanding of work as the
primary means to the self-realization of the worker also explains
his aversion to the characterization of work as a commodity or "a
special kind of 'merchandise'" available for sale.23 Likewise, the
image of employment as a bargain between labor and capital is a
Id.
17 See id. 5-6.
18 Id. 4.
19 Id.
20 Id. 6.
21 See id. 5-6.
22 Id. 6.
23 Id. 7.
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similarly unwise simplification of the dynamic relationship
between the human person's work and the earth's resources.
Since the concept of capital includes not only the natural
resources placed at man's disposal, but also the whole collection
of means by which man appropriates natural resources and
transforms them in accordance with his needs, it must
immediately be noted that all these means are the result of the
historical heritage of human labor.24
Instead, John Paul II looked to a workplace that transcended
materialist solutions in pursuit of a way of doing business
dedicated to raising both the objective and subjective dimensions
of the work experience. 25
The right to a "just wage" has been the hallmark of Catholic
social teaching on work since Leo XIII's 1891 encyclical, Rerum
Novarum. The theme of the just wage is also a significant theme
of Laborem Exercens, as evidenced by John Paul II's decision to
address the role of work in the "social question" and to designate
24 Id.
25 John Paul II's analysis of the tension between labor and capital is
reminiscent of Marx's definition of capital as "objectified labor." It is not surprising,
therefore, that the late Pope shared some of Marx's interest in breaking political and
social barriers that left workers in a condition that they both perceived as
undesirable. The Christian personalism implicit in John Paul II's understanding of
worker rights, however, could not be fully realized through the economic and
political re-ordering of society along Marx's lines. While it is true that Marx and
John Paul II part company on many fundamental points, Marx's understanding of
labor shares many characteristics with the late Pope's explanation in Laborem
Exercens. See GREGORY BAUM, THE PRIORITY OF LABOR: A COMMENTARY ON
LABOREMEXERCENS, ENCYCLICAL LETTER OF POPE JOHN PAUL II 12-13, 57-58, 80-
86 (1982). In Das Kapital, Marx wrote:
Labour is, first of all, a process between man and nature, a process by
which man, through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the
metabolism between himself and nature.... Through this movement he
acts upon external nature and changes it, and in this way he
simultaneously changes his own nature.... Man not only effects a change
of form in the materials of nature; he also realizes [verwirklicht] his own
purpose in those materials. And this is a purpose he is conscious of, it
determines the mode of his activity with the rigidity of a law, and he must
subordinate his will to it. This subordination is no mere momentary act.
Apart from the exertion of the working organs, a purposeful will is required
for the entire duration of the work. This means close attention. The less he
is attracted by the nature of the work and the way in which it has to be
accomplished, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as the free play of his
own physical and mental powers, the closer his attention is forced to be.
1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 283-84 (Ben Fowkes
trans., Vintage Books 1977) (1867); see also id. at 992-93 (explaining "capital as
objectified labour").
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Laborem Exercens as one of a series of papal writings honoring
the various anniversaries of Rerum Novarum.26 Rerum Novarum
painted a relatively simple image of a worker who negotiates
with his employer for a "just wage," by which Leo meant a wage
sufficient to support the worker and his family in modest
comfort. 27 John Paul II's picture of the workplace is far more
complex, comprising not only the worker and a "direct employer"
but also one or more "indirect employers. ' 28 This more detailed
exposition of workplace relations required a correspondently
more nuanced explanation of a "just wage."
In Laborem Exercens, John Paul II identified "[tihe key
problem of social ethics" in relation to work as "just
remuneration for work done."29 The just wage, viewed in this
context, is one expression of the moral imperative to respect,
encourage and facilitate the human person in his or her ability to
become "fully human" and thus, fully receptive to the divine. 30
John Paul II saw the just wage not only as the fundamental
resolution of the relationship between employer and worker, but
also as an effective benchmark for assessing "the justice of the
whole socioeconomic system."31 The late Pope's vision of a just
workplace was comprehensive, incorporating specific references
to the need for health insurance and pensions, as well as work
schedules that respect the right to rest, worship and family life.
32
In John Paul II's thought, the human person's subjective
experience of work is essential to his or her well-being and to the
preservation of his or her dignity as a human being. Thus, John
Paul II's comprehensive picture of the workplace produces an
equally broad depiction of the just wage as a family wage,
coupled with a social obligation to provide for health care
insurance and pensions.
26 See LABOREMEXERCENS, supra note 4, 1.
27 See RERUMNOVARUM, supra note 5, 46.
28 See, e.g., LABOREMEXERCENS, supra note 4, 17.
29 Id. 19.
30 Id.
31 Id. The term "resolution" is taken from the Pope's reference to resolving the
relationship between employer and worker. See id.; see also BAUM, supra note 25, at
48.
32 See LABOREMEXERCENS, supra note 4, 19.
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II. THE FIDUCIARY AS INDIRECT EMPLOYER
Modern compensation systems require at least two active
positions of authority. First, the employer must set forth a
compensation strategy, a task that is shaped and influenced by
external factors such as government regulations, industry
standards, market economics and union demands. The overall
compensation strategy of a particular employer often involves the
design and maintenance of one or more employee benefit plans
subject to ERISA. One of the key issues that an employer faces
in designing an employee benefit plan is the manner in which the
plan will be administered and implemented. In compensation
arrangements that are subject to ERISA, the party responsible
for the implementation of an employee benefit plan is the plan
fiduciary. In designing the plan, the employer may decide the
scope of the fiduciary's responsibilities, but it is the fiduciary who
is then charged with carrying out these responsibilities and
exercising the discretion assigned to the position. Both the
employer and the fiduciary therefore exercise two distinct
functions in terms of modern employee benefit plans.
The application of Catholic social thought might, in theory,
be confined to elements of plan design-issues normally within
the purview of the employer in the role of settlor. Moreover, one
of the most significant design issues-the amount of authority
invested in the plan fiduciary-clearly is a decision that belongs
to the employer in the role of plan sponsor. Likewise, the plan
sponsor normally is responsible for appointing a fiduciary and, in
many cases, elects to appoint itself. The Christian personalism
that animates John Paul II's understanding of the workplace has
much to say to the employer on both points.
John Paul II's worker-centered vision of the workplace can
also illuminate the role of the fiduciary and, in so doing,
underscore the importance of the decisions an employer makes
concerning the appointment of the plan fiduciary and the extent
of the discretionary authority attached to this position. In this
section of the paper, I suggest that John Paul II's concept of an
"indirect employer" may incorporate the independent ERISA
fiduciary and strengthen the understanding of fiduciary
2006]
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functions, particularly when the interests of the plan sponsor and
the plan participant are in conflict. 33
A. Indirect Employer and Independent Fiduciaries
John Paul II's call for the establishment of "an ethically
correct labor policy"34 was more ambitious than a simple plea for
individual employers to pay their employees a "just wage." The
term "indirect employer" includes "all the agents at the national
and international level that are responsible for the whole
orientation of labor policy."35 These agents include "both persons
and institutions of various kinds and also collective labor
contracts and the principles of conduct which are laid down by
these persons and institutions and which determine the whole
socioeconomic system or are its result."36
33 In the vibrant discussion facilitated by St. John's sponsorship of this
conference, Professor Stabile pointed out that, in some sense, a fiduciary is in a
subsidiary position in relationship to the employer. She therefore takes issue with
my premise that one can identify a fiduciary as an "indirect employer." Here, I think
it is helpful to turn to John Paul II's explanation of the indirect employer as one who
"substantially determines one or other facet of the labor relationship, thus
conditioning the conduct of the direct employer when the latter determines in
concrete terms the actual work contract and labor relations." Id. 17. Two factors
seem to me to support the notion of the fiduciary as an indirect employer. First, the
standards of conduct of an independent fiduciary reflect the business practices of
banks and insurance companies that devote substantial parts of their activities to
providing this service. To the extent that one can view plan administration (which
can very well include the performance of fiduciary duties) as a business, it is also
possible to conceptualize this industry as an external influence upon the direct
employer. While the employer certainly is able to appoint the fiduciary of a plan, an
independent fiduciary (for example, a third-party administrator of a health plan
who, pursuant to the plan document, assumes responsibility for the discretionary
decisions regarding coverage under the plan) plays an extraordinarily powerful role
in the interpretation of plan documents in the application of plan terms. Insurance
company practices with regard to the meaning of technical medical terms, with
respect to the understanding of procedures as experimental and other issues,
certainly have influenced the design and administration of plans. While a plan could
be designed to restrict a fiduciary's responsibilities to the automatic replication of
plan terms, the post-Firestone fiduciary who retains discretionary authority of the
interpretation of plan terms is a formidable force in determining the nature of the
benefits that an employee ultimately receives. Moreover, a two-hatted fiduciary who
follows ERISA's fiduciary requirements also has a statutorily-imposed obligation to
put the plan participant's interest ahead of the settlor's interest, which seems to me
to be strikingly similar to those who set down codes of conduct or are signatories of
collective bargaining agreements. This is obviously an area where further research
might lead to an interesting re-appraisal of our understanding of the fiduciary's role.
34 Id.
35 Id. 18.
36 Id. 17.
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By introducing the picture of the "indirect employer" into our
vision of the workplace, John Paul II draws attention to the
social nature of the human person and the inevitable connection
between human beings in economic relationships. The bonds of
employment are sufficiently elastic to connect a worker to factors
and influences that are external to the specific relationship that
she shares with the employer who pays her for her labor. In
combination, this complexity and elasticity suggest that the
payment of a just wage is not solely the responsibility of the
worker and the direct employer. The obligations of the direct
employer also extend to the indirect employer who influences the
conditions and manner in which the direct employer makes
decisions concerning the workers.
John Paul II introduced the term "indirect employer," but did
not set forth a specific static definition. The key question for the
Pope was whether a person or entity "substantially determines
one or other facet of the labor relationship, thus conditioning the
conduct of the direct employer when the latter determines in
concrete terms the actual work contract and labor relations."37
These "indirect employers" define and condition the relationship
between the direct employer and the worker.38  Laborem
Exercens leaves the discussion of the "indirect employer" at a
theoretical level, however, and neither expands nor confines the
application of this concept beyond these general sentiments.
Scholars have offered a variety of interpretations of the
phrase "indirect employer." These interpretations, while diverse,
find a common beginning point in the theology of solidarity. To
quote Patricia Lamoureux, solidarity is:
[T]he primary authentic attitude toward society that
signifies a constant readiness to accept one's share in the
community and to serve the common good. It is an attitude of
community in which the common good properly initiates
participation, and participation in turn properly serves the
common good, fosters it, and furthers its realization. 39
Solidarity emphasizes the moral rights and responsibilities
of living in community. Likewise, the concept of the "indirect
employer.., implies that responsibility for the injustices that
mark our world cannot be evaded because there are numerous
37 Id.
38 See id.
39 Lamoureux, supra note 4, at 398-99.
20061
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bodies that have some degree of complicity in these injustices."40
Given this recognition of expansive and interactive ties between
economic actors in society, Lamoureux notes that the term
"refers to many different elements that influence employment
and conditions of employment" and "comprises such things as
labor legislation, labor unions, transportation systems, child
care, job training, and, in particular, government."41 Economist
Albino Barrera observes an "ever tighter web of indirect
employer relationships" in an increasingly globalized world.42
While it is possible to think of the indirect employer strictly in
terms of its potential to exploit the workplace or to benefit from
unjust conditions of the workplace, Barrera points to the positive
influence of indirect employers that is evident in the recent
success of students in persuading universities to take an active
stance concerning the working conditions in the Third World
garment factories that manufacture their licensed logo apparel.43
It is therefore important to stress that the influence of an
indirect employer is not necessarily negative. Standardization of
business practices concerning the amount of wages or the
conditions of employment may have a positive effect on
workplace relations.
The term "indirect employer" offers an insightful
characterization of the independent fiduciary's relationship to
plan participants. Characterizing an independent fiduciary as a
subordinate to an employer or as a functionary who carries out
the plan sponsor's will simply does not capture the very real
discretion that many independent fiduciaries exercise as a
condition of their contractual relationship to the plan and its
sponsor. Whether it is a bank acting as trustee of a pension plan
or a third-party administrator exercising discretionary authority
over health insurance claims, an independent fiduciary brings its
own business practices to the disposition of each particular
benefit plan. In fact, some health plans are specifically drafted to
take into account the standard language utilized by a particular
third-party administrator. In some cases, business practices and
40 Id. at 399.
41 Id.
42 Albino Barrera, Gaudium et Spes and Catholic Ethics in Post-Industrial
Economics: Indirect Employers and Globalization, 3 J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 321,
322 (2006).
43 See id. at 321.
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assumptions external to the plan document have an undeniable
effect on the manner in which a particular independent fiduciary
deals with claims under a particular plan.
Thinking about the independent fiduciary as an "indirect
employer" bolsters understanding of the importance of its
relationship to plan participants. If one regards the independent
fiduciary as an "indirect employer," then the obligations of
sustaining a just workplace extend to the independent fiduciary
as well as to the employer. Writing of the general social
obligation to advance a just workplace, Lamoureux summarizes
the teaching of Laborem Exercens as follows "Establishing an
ethically correct labor policy, one that respects workers' rights to
work, to a just wage and to form labor associations, the
influences of both direct and indirect employers must be taken
into consideration." 44 Subject to ERISA's fiduciary standards, the
independent fiduciary thus represents the interests of plan
participants not simply as a matter of legal compliance but also
because of the moral and ethical obligations imposed upon
indirect employers. In matters of potential conflict between the
interest of an employer and the interest of a participant, the
independent fiduciary has even greater reason to stand up to
potential employer abuses when all parties recognize his
ultimate responsibility as an indirect employer.
B. Problems Facing Independent and "Two-Hat" Fiduciaries
ERISA requires fiduciaries to manage assets and make
decisions "in the exclusive interest of plan participants," but adds
little guidance concerning the meaning of this phrase. 45
44 Lamoureux, supra note 4, at 399.
45 Section 402(a)(1) of ERISA provides that every employee benefit plan "shall
provide for one or more named fiduciaries who jointly or severally shall have
authority to control and manage the operation and administration of the plan." 29
U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2000). The "named fiduciary" is "a fiduciary who is named in the
plan instrument" or who "is identified as a fiduciary (A) by a person who is an
employer or employee organization with respect to the plan or (B) by such an
employer and such an employee organization acting jointly." ERISA § 402(a)(2), 29
U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2). Despite the requirement of a named fiduciary, ERISA also
provides an additional functional test to identify potential fiduciaries. Section
404(a)(1) of ERISA provides that "a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect
to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries .. " 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1). Moreover, the fiduciary must act "for the exclusive purpose
of... providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and... defraying
reasonable expenses of administering the plan." ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C.
20061
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Moreover, courts have interpreted ERISA to permit a plan
sponsor to act as the fiduciary of its own plans, thus
compounding the burden of the statute's fiduciary requirements
to traditional duties of care and loyalty owed by every corporate
decision maker to the employer. 46 While ERISA lawyers light-
heartedly refer to this predicament as the "two-hat rule," there is
little humor to be found in the fiduciary's struggle to serve both
the employee and his or her employer. Those of us who are
Christians have it on the best authority that one cannot easily
serve two masters.
Using the term "indirect employer" to describe independent
fiduciaries illuminates the problems that may arise when a plan
sponsor appoints itself to serve as the plan fiduciary. While the
obligations of the direct employer are not materially different
from those of an indirect employer, the indirect employer has the
opportunity to hold the employer accountable because of its
familiarity with external practices and its distance from the
employer's profit-maximizing goals. If an employer sponsors an
employee benefit plan and appoints itself as plan administrator,
the mediating role of the indirect employer may be lost in a way
that ERISA's fiduciary obligations cannot realistically overcome.
Some statistics serve to illustrate the financial scope of the
fiduciary's responsibilities and the significance of its role as
decision maker with regard to the individual savings and health
benefits of employees. The ERISA fiduciary faces a staggering
§ 1104(a)(1)(A). The ERISA fiduciary must perform these duties "with the care, skill,
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent
man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims." ERISA
§ 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). When a person is not acting as a fiduciary,
the constraints of fiduciary law are not present. When the constraints of fiduciary
law must be observed, they are largely procedural in nature. If the proper
procedures are followed at the proper time, then a fiduciary may rest easy in his
decisions.
46 See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 223 (2000). Moreover, a 2004
Supreme Court ruling clarified that working owners could also be participants in an
employee benefit plan. See Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v.
Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 23 (2004). The Supreme Court stated:
The purpose of the anti-inurement provision, in common with ERISA's
other fiduciary responsibility provisions, is to apply the law of trusts to
discourage abuses such as self-dealing, imprudent investment, and
misappropriation of plan assets, by employers and others. Those concerns
are not implicated by paying benefits to working owners who participate on
an equal basis with nonowner employees in ERISA-protected plans.
Id. (citation omitted).
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financial and social responsibility. In 2003, the total dollar value
of assets held in tax-qualified retirement plans reached $13.3
trillion.47 Private-sector defined benefit plans account for $1.8
trillion of this amount, while private-sector defined contribution
plans hold $2.66 trillion in assets.48 In 2004, the administrators
of employment-based health insurance plans made decisions
affecting the health care of 174.2 million Americans. 49 The
administration of these plans takes place amidst increasing
uncertainty over the future delivery of employment-related
retirement 50 and health benefits. 51 The potential impact of this
uncertainty is enormous: in 2005, individual Americans received
retirement benefit payments of $1.131 trillion and health benefit
payments of $915.8 billion. 52
Designing compensation arrangements is a task that no
employer can escape; when the arrangement includes employee
benefits, the implementation of benefit plans is the core of every
ERISA fiduciary's work. Conventional wisdom suggests that the
purpose of compensation arrangements is to attract and retain
effective workers who will contribute to the fulfillment of the
employer's goals. 53 To a serious-minded ERISA fiduciary in
47 EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., TOTAL U.S. RETIREMENT PLAN ASSETS,
2004, http://www.ebri.org/publicationsbenfaq/index.cfm?fa=retfaq4.
48 EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ASSETS IN PRIVATE SECTOR DEFINED
BENEFIT, DEFINED CONTRIBUTION, AND INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS, 1985-
2004, http://www.ebri.org/publicationslbenfaq/index.cfm?fa=retfaql3.
49 Paul Fronstin, Uninsured Unchanged in 2004, but Employment-Based Health
Coverage Declined, EBRI NOTES, Oct. 2005, at 2, 2, available at http://www.ebri.org/
pdf/notespdf/EBRINotes 10-20051.pdf.
50 In the fifteen years between 1988 and 2003, retirement plan participants
reported a dramatic shift in the primary type of private retirement plan
participation. See EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., PRIMARY TYPE OF
RETIREMENT PLAN, BY SECTOR, 1988, 1998, & 2003, http://www.ebri.org/publications/
benfaq/index.cfm?fa=retfaqtl3. In 1988, 53.7% of retirement plan participants
reported that their primary plan was a defined benefit plan, while only 27.4%
reported that a defined contribution plan was their primary savings vehicle. Id. By
2003 only 27.4% of plan participants reported a defined benefit plan as their primary
plan, while 71.1% relied primarily on defined contribution savings. Id.
51 See Fronstin, supra note 49, at 2-3, 7.
52 EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS, CHAPTER 2: FINANCES OF THE EMPLOYEE BENEFIT SYSTEM,
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publicationsfbooks/databook/DB.Chapter%2002.pdf.
53 See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN, SUSAN J. STABILE & BRUCE A. WOLK,
PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAw 30-31 (4th ed. 2006) (describing employee
benefit plans as "bonding to the firm"). But see COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION
TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 17-18 (2004) (noting increasing
portability of benefits).
2006]
538 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 45:523
pursuit of the "exclusive interest of plan participants," however,
such a goal poses a challenge. If the workplace compensation
arrangement serves a principle of profit-maximization, then what
is in the best interest of the plan participants? Is it a thriving
profitable workplace or the generous administration of benefit
plans? One need only scan newspaper headlines to note the
termination of employee benefit plans or the freezing of benefit
accruals-evidence of both real and perceived conflicts between
the employer's profitability and the employee's financial well-
being. 54
An independent fiduciary whose business objective is to
service the plan in accordance with its terms may attach some
value to the employer's ability to sustain its profitability and to
meet obligations to its creditors, including plan participants. Yet
the independent fiduciary is, by definition, less deeply implicated
in the ups and downs of an employer's financial fortune than the
employer itself. The independent fiduciary must comply with
ERISA's mandate to act in the best interest of participants. The
concept of the indirect employer supports this legal requirement
with the moral weight of the indirect employer's own obligation
to correct inequities in the workplace. It can serve as a useful
way of determining just what the "best interest of the
participant" might mean.
Greater uncertainty and anxiety plague the fiduciary who
wears "two hats." If a "two-hatted" fiduciary resolves an
ambiguity in favor of a plan participant, is he or she failing to
observe the loyalty due to the employer? If the decision goes the
other way, has the fiduciary violated the obligation to act in the
best interest of the participant? To a fiduciary who "wears two
hats," the line between benevolence in the treatment of plan
participants and foolhardiness in neglecting the employer's
financial goals can seem very thin indeed. 55 A beleaguered
54 See, e.g., Press Release, Gen. Motors Corp., GM Announces Restructuring of
Its U.S. Salaried Ret. Benefits (Mar. 7, 2006), available at
http://www.prdomain.com/companies/G/GeneralMotors/newsreleases/20063829769.h
tm; see also Jack VanDerhei, Defined Benefit Plan Freezes: Who's Affected, How
Much, and Replacing Lost Accrual, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, Mar. 2006, at 1, available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdffbriefspdflEBRI IB_03-20063.pdf.
55 See In re Cardinal Health, Inc. ERISA Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1019-20
(S.D. Ohio 2006).
[I]n every case charging a defendant with the breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty, the
threshold question is not whether the actions of some person employed to provide
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fiduciary may find some consolation in the tendency of courts to
measure compliance with ERISA's fiduciary standards by
reference to procedural safeguards. 56 A prudent ERISA fiduciary
reads the plan document, gathers data, consults experts, and
documents decision making in an effort to show that his or her
decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious.57 These procedures
can and do produce results that are acceptable to both employer
and employee. Yet not all decisions are equally palatable to the
affected parties. Court dockets are replete with claims that an
ERISA fiduciary has breached the duty to act in the best interest
of the participant. Adherence to decision making standards that
are procedurally compliant but fail to produce a result that
makes a participant whole seems ironic.
John Paul II's understanding of work and the central
importance of human dignity guides an answer to this question.
Both the direct and indirect employers are charged with the
responsibility to oversee a just workplace that facilitates both the
objective and subjective dimensions of work. Moreover, the
extent to which they succeed in this task is measurable by
reference to their ability to maintain a just wage relationship.
The focus on justice collapses the potential conflict between the
interest of the plan participants and the interest of the direct and
indirect employers. In such a workplace, the emphasis on human
dignity-measurable by the just wage-is the prime motivation
of all parties. The employer's interest in making a profit or
services under a plan adversely affected a plan beneficiary's interest, but whether
that person was acting as a fiduciary (that is, was performing a fiduciary function)
when taking the action subject to the complaint.
Id.
56 See id. at 1018 (stating that fiduciaries are charged with proper management,
administration and investment of plan assets, maintenance of proper records,
disclosures of specified information and avoidance of conflict of interest); see also
Laborers Nat'l Pension Fund v. N. Trust Quantitative Advisors, Inc., 173 F.3d 313,
317 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that the test of prudence is one of conduct and not
performance and that the focus of the inquiry is how the fiduciary acted, not the
performance of the investment selected).
57 See In re Cardinal Health, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 1020.
Because the 'prudent person' standard focuses on whether the fiduciary utilized
appropriate methods to investigate and evaluate the merits of a particular
investment, what is considered 'appropriate' in a particular case depends upon the
'character' and 'aim' of the particular plan and decisions at issue and the
'circumstances prevailing' at the time a particular course of action must be
investigated and undertaken.
Id. (citing In re Dynegy Inc. ERISA Litig., 309 F. Supp. 2d 861, 875 (S.D. Tex. 2004)).
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creating a product is compatible with but subordinate to the
necessity of establishing a workplace that facilitates human
dignity. Thus, where conflict might arise because of a fiduciary
action that is in the best interest of the participant in a profit-
maximizing workplace, a shared commitment to human dignity
lends a predictable hierarchy to the response of employer,
fiduciary, and worker in a workplace dedicated to the just wage,
where all parties recognize the obligations of the direct and
indirect employer.
While the use of Catholic social thought to explain and
encourage the reform of employee benefits is admittedly outside
the mainstream, this article is not unique in proposing that the
independent fiduciary model is more attuned to ERISA's
fundamental purposes and to advancing the rights of workers.
There are clearly situations in which the appointment of an
independent fiduciary is beyond the financial or practical
capacity of a small employer that sponsors a particular plan.
However, even in these cases,' Catholic social thought can offer a
heightened sense of responsibility to the "two-hat" fiduciary.
III. GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATIONS OF WORKPLACE
COMPENSATION AND FIDUCIARY OPERATIONS THROUGH THE
SYSTEMS APPROACH
These normative assertions-that human dignity is the
greatest value in the workplace and that the plan fiduciary may
be characterized as an indirect employer-beg to be placed in the
context of the real problems that plan sponsors and plan
fiduciaries face on a daily basis. This section of the article offers
a series of graphical depictions that demonstrate the differences
between a workplace compensation arrangement that is seriously
dedicated to the achievement of dignity in the workplace and a
workplace that has financial viability as its major goal. These
graphics reveal the extraordinary pressures that work upon the
"two-hat" fiduciary and illustrate the independent fiduciary's
comparative freedom to resist similar constraints.
In order to convey the complex empirical and legal aspects of
the modern American compensation scheme, I have turned to the
"systems approach."58  Intensely fact-based, the systems
58 See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL
L. REV. 479 (1997) (describing the methods of systems analysis and how they are
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approach emphasizes the complexity and the connectivity of
relationships between and among components of a system.59
According to Lynn LoPucki, a leading proponent of this
methodology:
Systems analysis proceeds by identifying systems, discovering
their goals or attributing goals to them, mapping their
subsystems and the functions each performs, determining their
internal structures, depicting them with attention paid to
efficiency of presentation, and searching for internal
inconsistencies. These methods generate analytical power by
increasing the number of goals, elements, and circumstances
that the analyst can take into account simultaneously. 60
The purpose of systems analysis is to increase understanding by
"accommodat[ing] as much complexity as possible." 61  Systems
analysis maps the dynamic and static relationships between
components of a system in order to shed light on the extent to
which these relationships facilitate, frustrate or impede systemic
goals.62 In this sense, systems analysis does not require or, to
use LoPucki's phrase, "commit the researcher to [the]
improvement" of systems; neither does it stop the analyst from
doing so. 63 The purpose of systems analysis is fundamentally
descriptive and the description that it offers is by definition
intricate, complex and multi-faceted.64
being applied in the field of law); Lynn M. LoPucki, Twerski and Cohen's Second
Revolution: A Systems/Strategic Perspective, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 55 (1999) (applying
principles of systems analysis in order to analyze the effect that imposing a duty on
health care providers to inform clients that other providers might be able to perform
services better or more safely would have on the medical care delivery system); R. C.
Tomlinson, Operational Research and Systems Analysis: From Practice to Precept,
287 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'y LONDON 355 (1977) (tracing the development
of systems analysis in the United Kingdom).
59 See LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, supra note 58, at 481-83, 485-
87.
60 Id. at 481.
61 Id.
62 See id. at 487.
63 See id. at 488.
64 See id. at 521-22. John Paul II's understanding of the human person begins
with a similar appreciation of complexity and connectivity, a sociological perspective
uniquely suited to analysis by the systems approach. See generally LABOREM
EXERCENS, supra note 4, 17-18 (describing the influence of the indirect
employer).
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A. The Workplace Compensation System
Systems analysis should enable us to examine the workplace
system within which a particular company creates its
compensation and retirement arrangements. Assume that a
manufacturer establishes a workplace compensation
arrangement that includes several employee benefit plans in
addition to normal wage and salary payments. If we can identify
the normative goals of this system, we can examine whether the
legally permissible choices offered to an employer effectively
permit the employer to reach this goal. In addition, this mode of
analysis should also permit us to examine the potential effect of
changing either the goal of the system or, through legislative or
judicial interpretation, the range of legally permissible choices.
Assume, for example, that we first analyze the
manufacturer's workplace compensation system with the idea
that "profit-maximization" is the normative goal of the
corporation. Once this goal is identified, we can then look to the
range of choices that would be legally permissible within the
scope of ERISA and determine whether the choice an employer
has made is effectively achieving that goal.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the workplace compensation
arrangements of a manufacturer that produces and sells a
product to the public. Figures 1 and 2 assume that the employer
appoints an independent fiduciary to administer the plans and
that the employer's goal is profit-maximization. Figure 2 adds an
additional layer of complexity by including external forces such
as government-mandated benefits, market forces, and the
integration of the delivery and financing of health care that is
typical of many managed care networks.
" The employer sponsors a defined contribution plan and a
health plan for the benefit of eligible employees. The
employer designs each plan and appoints an independent
fiduciary to administer the plan. The employer makes
contributions to each plan as provided in the plan
documents. The employer also complies with and
contributes to federal- and state-mandated benefit
programs. In addition, the employer sets the price point
for its product, which is reflective of costs and market
conditions.
" The employee performs services for the employer in
exchange for wage compensation and the benefits
provided under the plan. To the extent permitted or
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required by the plan, the employee makes contributions to
the defined contribution plan from his or her wages and
pays premiums, deductibles and co-payments in
connection with the benefits provided by the health plan.
* The independent fiduciary receives compensation for his
or her services to the plan. In exchange, the fiduciary
exercises all powers designated under the plan, including
the power to interpret the plan document and to exercise
discretionary authority over questions of eligibility or
coverage.
Figure 3 illustrates workplace compensation arrangements
that are identical to those in Figures 1 and 2 with one exception.
In Figure 3, the employer serves as the plan fiduciary, a practice
commonly known as "wearing two hats."
The employer makes contributions to each plan as provided in
the plan documents. The employer also complies with and
contributes to federal- and state-mandated benefit programs.
In addition, the employer sets the price point for its product,
which is reflective of costs and market conditions. In his or her
capacity as fiduciary, the employer now exercises all powers
designated under the plan, including the power to interpret the
plan document and to exercise discretionary authority over
questions of eligibility or coverage.
The employee's situation remains unchanged.
In Figures 1, 2 and 3, the employer's discretion over the
financial arrangements among the parties is dominant. The
employer sets the price point of the product, designs the
employee benefit plan structure, and is likely the dominant force
in setting the amount of wages that are paid to the employee.
The employer's authority and discretion are even greater in
Figure 3, where the employer has chosen to exercise authority as
plan fiduciary as well.
Assuming that the purpose of the workplace compensation
system is to facilitate profit-maximization, the opportunities for
the employer to manipulate the costs of benefit care greatly
outweigh the ability of the employee to maximize the
compensation he or she receives in exchange for services. In
Figures 1 and 2, the independent fiduciary may temper the
employer's relationship with employees by virtue of its fiduciary
duty to act in the exclusive interest of plan participants. In
Figure 3, however, the employer also serves as plan fiduciary.
Without the mediating influence of the independent fiduciary,
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the employer has even more control over the manner in which
benefits are administered. While it does not necessarily follow
that the employer will place corporate goals ahead of the
execution of the fiduciary requirements of ERISA, it is clear that
there are fewer checks on the employer's capacity to arrange plan
administration to the corporation's benefit and to the detriment
of the participants.
Figure 4 assumes that the normative goal of the
compensation and retirement arrangement is "emphasizing the
dignity of the human person." This assumption dramatically
changes the depiction of the workplace compensation system. As
described above, John Paul II's understanding of work comprised
both subjective and objective elements. Since the subjective
experience of work directly transforms the worker's self-
awareness and defines his or her self-realization, the importance
of subjective considerations is at least as important as the
objective considerations and, in cases of conflict, is always the
dominant role. Thus, a compensation arrangement designed to
maximize human dignity cannot limit its consideration to the
production of goods and the remuneration of employees. The
decision-making process must also acknowledge the
overwhelming significance of the worker's subjective experience.
Figure 4 therefore depicts the relationship between employer
and employee as having two significant components-the
subjective component and the objective component. The objective
component of work is the production and distribution of a
product, which I have depicted as encompassing the
compensation arrangement. The less tangible component of
work-the subjective growth and satisfaction of the employee-is
at least equal to and potentially greater than the objective
element of work. Even if the objective component of work is at
risk, the subjective element cannot be diminished. This
workplace cannot be sustained by maximizing profits at the
expense of the subjective experience of the human person.
B. Fiduciary Dilemmas
The difference between the depiction of the profit-
maximizing employment system in Figures 1 and 2 and Figure 3
and the subjective/objective perspective in Figure 4 is the relative
importance placed on profits. It is important to understand that
the actions of the employer and the fiduciary in Figures 1, 2 and
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3 are not illegal and do not challenge any of the conventional
norms established by ERISA or by common practice in the
administration of employee benefits in the United States. The
employer and the fiduciary in Figures 1, 2 and 3 are very likely
to be decent, law-abiding citizens who undertake their
responsibilities in a serious and business-like fashion.
The employer in Figure 4 also strives for legal compliance
and competitive performance in the market place. Yet, because
this employer's goal is defined in terms of enhancing both the
subjective and objective dimensions of work, the decision-making
process may be different for the fiduciary of the employer's plans.
Does the range of choices that are legally permissible under
ERISA remain available to an employer committed to an
approach that resembles Figure 4 and the fiduciary who
administers that plan? The answer is yes, of course, the legally
permissible options are always available. The more interesting
question, in my opinion, is whether the least burdensome of the
legal approaches is consistent with a commitment to administer
a plan that in a manner that places prime value on human
dignity in the workplace.
IV. WORKPLACE COMPENSATION WITH A COMMITMENT TO
HUMAN DIGNITY: WHAT DIFFERENCE MIGHT
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT MAKE?
What possible contribution to ERISA jurisprudence might
one find in John Paul II's understanding of work, as set forth in
Laborem Exercens? The relevance of Catholic social thought to
Catholic, church-related corporations may be apparent, but do
these ideas have any value to decision-makers who are neither
Catholic nor the custodians of corporations that identify with the
Catholic Church?
In Laborem Exercens, John Paul II provided a new
framework for thinking about the manner in which an employer
might calculate a just wage. The Pope's appreciation of the
subjective and objective dimensions of work encourages
employers to reappraise their compensation strategies. By
reframing the discussion concerning a just wage to recognize the
importance of the subjective dimension of work to the full
development of the human person, the Pope's work suggests two
challenges for employers who incorporate employee benefit plans
as part of their compensation strategies. The first question,
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which is addressed in Part III, above, is whether the
appointment of an independent fiduciary might enhance the
subjective experience of work and the validation of the human
person by adding an independent voice to the administration of
the plan. The second question, which is applicable regardless of
whether the plan sponsor appoints an independent fiduciary or
decides to don two hats and administer a plan through its own
employees, is whether a fiduciary's strict adherence to procedural
safeguards is sufficient to protect and validate the dignity of plan
participants.
This second challenge is a topic familiar to lawyers who
follow the courts' on-going struggle with ERISA and its
application. ERISA jurisprudence has wrestled for many years
with the parameters of fiduciary decision-making. How do we
know when a fiduciary's decision concerning the investment of
defined benefit plan assets is correct? Are we confident in a
fiduciary's decision to interpret a health plan's exclusion of
"experimental procedures" as the basis for denying coverage for
an autologous bone marrow transplant requested by a
participant who is battling breast cancer? In some cases, courts
are able to identify both substantive and procedural flaws that
are plainly at odds with the language of a given plan or with the
fiduciary obligations set forth in ERISA by Congress. In others,
however, the court reaches its decision concerning the legality of
a particular decision by evaluating the process (sometimes
flagrantly abused) by which a decision is reached. While I do not
take issue with the strict procedural safeguards encouraged by
this approach, a single-minded focus on process suggests the
disheartening lesson that substantive mistakes are excusable if
the fiduciary follows procedural rules.
This final section sets forth several well-known cases to
illustrate the problems that may arise from a strict focus on the
procedural merits of a decision. In Donovan v. Mazzola,65 the
Ninth Circuit set forth procedural guidelines for fiduciary
decision-making under ERISA. A brief examination of the
decision in Fischer v. Philadelphia Electric Co.6 6 sets forth the
Third Circuit's explanation of the manner in which a plan
fiduciary should communicate information concerning early
65 716 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 761 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir.
1985).
66 96 F.3d 1533 (3d Cir. 1996).
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retirement windows to employees. Finally, the decision in
Mushalla v. Teamsters Local No. 863 Pension Fund67 offers facts
that can be used to illustrate the difference between decision-
making guided by technical adherence to procedural rules that do
not lead to decisions that sustain the subjective dimension of
work or respect the human person and those that might.
A. Donovan v. Mazzola: Setting Out the Basics of Fiduciary
Decisionmaking Under ERISA
In Mazzola, the Ninth Circuit addressed fiduciary concerns
raised by the activities of the trustees of a union-sponsored
pension fund during the years immediately following ERISA's
effective date.68 Although the Mazzola opinion dates from 1983
(more than eight years after ERISA became effective), the
decision belongs to an early generation of appellate decisions that
thrashed out the parameters of ERISA jurisprudence. While the
Mazzola court ultimately ruled that the defendant trustees had
violated ERISA's fiduciary requirements, the opinion focused on
the trustees' procedural gaffes. The Mazzola court, in effect,
provided procedural instructions to trustees who were disinclined
to share the trustees' fate.
In the mid-1950s, Local Union 38 and the employers of its
members established a pension plan "to provide retirement
benefits to union members and their beneficiaries.' 69 Several
years later the union and the employers established the
Convalescent Fund of Local Union 38, which eventually owned a
hotel (which charged discounted rates to fund participants), a
summer camp, and a retirement housing project. 70 The trustees
of the pension fund served as an "Advisory Committee" to the
fiduciary of the Convalescent Fund.71 Although the eligibility
requirements for participation in each fund were different, the
membership was "substantially the same."72
The Mazzola story, a favorite old chestnut of ERISA
casebooks, displays an astonishing entanglement of the plan
sponsor, the self-interest of the trustees, and a bizarre
67 300 F.3d 391 (3d Cir. 2002).
68 716 F.2d at 1228.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
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appointment of an unqualified crony to advise the trustees on the
management of plan assets. In 1975, shortly after ERISA
became effective, the trustees of the pension plan authorized the
disbursement of $1.5 million in plan assets as a loan to the
Convalescent Fund.73 Within a short time, however, the trustees
no longer required payment on this loan and permitted the
Convalescent Fund to take an extension on another loan without
providing additional security or agreeing to contractual terms
that would enhance the likelihood of repayment. 74
Indeed, 1975 proved to be a banner year for those who
aspired to borrow funds from the pension plan. The trustees also
approved a $2.25 million construction loan for the purpose of
constructing a spa on the Fund's property, secured by the
property itself.7 5 The trustees then loaned $650,000 in plan
assets to S&F Spas, a limited partnership whose investors
included Dr. Ernest Schwartz. 76 Dr. Schwartz was quite familiar
to the trustees, claiming a friendship with one of the trustees and
having served as personal physician to another.77 The purpose of
the S&F loan, which occurred after the approval of the
construction loan, was ostensibly to convert a hotel to a health
spa.7 8  Moreover, in 1977, the trustees paid Dr. Schwartz
$250,000 to conduct "a feasibility study to determine the most
profitable use of the Convalescent Fund's Konocti Harbor Inn."
79
The soap-opera quality of the Mazzola facts rises a notch higher
when one learns that Dr. Schwartz was a medical doctor who had
no training in real estate appraisal or the construction of spas.
80
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Mazzola provides several
important insights into the development of jurisprudential
thinking with regard to ERISA's fiduciary provisions. The court
clarified that ERISA's prudent person test differed from the more
common "business judgment rule."8 1  Describing the prudent
person test as "more exacting,"8 2 the court examined whether the
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1229.
76 Id.
77 See id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 See id. at 1233.
81 Id. at 1231.
82 Id.
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trustees "employed the appropriate methods to investigate the
merits of the investment and to structure the investment."8 3
The Mazzola trustees presented a textbook example of how
to violate ERISA's fiduciary provisions. The obvious conflict of
interest clearly troubled the court. The opinion notes that the
trustees served "on both sides of the loan transactions;
and... consistently transacted business with and for the
Convalescent Fund at all relevant times for the purpose of aiding
the Convalescent Fund at the expense of the Pension Fund." 4
The court chided the fiduciaries for failing to identify or appraise
the property that the Convalescent Fund offered as security, as
well as neglecting to search for prior encumbrances on the
property and charging a below-market interest rate.8 5 Similar
problems haunted the feasibility study. The fiduciaries did not
consider whether Dr. Schwartz was qualified to provide a
feasibility study or compare his proposed services and fees to that
of other consultants.8 6 Moreover, the fiduciaries did not hold Dr.
Schwartz to deadlines or require him to provide follow-up
consultations.8 7
While the Ninth Circuit's contempt for the behavior of the
Mazzola trustees illustrated quite clearly what fiduciaries should
not do, the procedural focus of this decision yielded only
procedural answers concerning the proper method of resolving
fiduciary problems under ERISA. If, on the one hand, it is
improper for a trustee to act on both sides of a transaction, to
neglect standard practices for evaluating security for loans, and
to hire buddies to perform feasibility studies outside their sphere
of professional competence, simple logic leads to the conclusion
that the prudent fiduciary will do none of the above. A prudent
fiduciary, therefore, would insure that he or she did not harbor a
potential conflict of interest with a prospective borrower, would
meet industry standards for determining the terms of a loan of
plan assets, and would only commission feasibility studies from
the best of a field of expert providers.
Certainly, admonishing fiduciaries to observe procedural
prudence is always very good advice. However, the Mazzola
83 Id. at 1232.
84 Id.
85 See id. at 1232-33.
86 Id. at 1233.
87 Id.
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opinion leaves at least one glaring omission. The Mazzola
decision tells the fiduciary how to act in the exclusive interest of
plan participants, but leaves no substantive criteria to measure
what that interest might be. Mazzola fails to provide the plan
participant with a meaningful vision of what this exclusive
interest is, other than the vague assurance that decisions
concerning his or her assets should be made fairly. If one looks
to the moral consequences of the Mazzola method of decision-
making, there is no guarantee that adherence to the Mazzola
principles will lead to a decision that advances the subjective
dimension of work or the dignity of the plan participant.
Observing procedural safeguards simply eliminates one way in
which fiduciary decision-making may violate the human dignity
of the plan participants; it does not orient the fiduciary in a
direction that will necessarily lead to the enhancement of the
plan participant's subjective experience of work.
B. Mushalla: The Conventional Way and the JPII Way
Communications concerning early-retirement windows are
often the basis for litigation, as the objectives of employers, plan
fiduciaries and plan participants are often at odds because
unspoken assumptions based on these communications can lead
to volatile and impulsive decision-making on the part of plan
participants. Its 1996 opinion attempted to rectify this problem
by offering a three-factor test to establish whether a change in
benefits was under serious consideration. Although adamantly
denying the suggestion that it was creating a bright-line test, the
court explained that serious consideration could be found when
"(1) a specific proposal (2) is being discussed for purposes of
implementation (3) by senior management with the authority to
implement the change." Thus, in theory, the concept of "serious
consideration" mediates between "an employee's right to
information and an employer's need to operate on a day-to-day
basis."
In Fischer v. Philadelphia Electric Co. ("Fischer If'), 88 the
Third Circuit explored the responsibility of a plan administrator
to employees who might become eligible for a potential early
retirement window. In its earlier, 1993 opinion in Fischer v.
88 96 F.3d 1533, 1536, 1538 (3d Cir. 1996).
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Philadelphia Electric Co. ("Fischer f,),89 the Third Circuit
instructed the lower court to determine whether a plan
administrator had materially misled participants when it stated
that no change in benefits was under consideration at the time
the participants were considering retirement. The court
explained that the materiality of any misrepresentation hinged
upon the seriousness with which any change was in fact under
consideration.90 By the time the case returned to the Third
Circuit in 1996, the court recognized that "serious consideration"
was an "amorphous concept."91 The court set forth a three-factor
test to permit administrators to determine whether a change in
benefits was under "serious consideration" and, thus,
necessitated the disclosure of this information to potentially
eligible participants who were considering retirement. 92
According to Fischer II, "serious consideration . . exists when (1)
a specific proposal (2) is being discussed for purposes of
implementation (3) by senior management with the authority to
implement the change. 93
An affirmative statement of the holding in Fischer H seems
quite simple. A plan administrator's duty to communicate
truthfully would therefore be discharged if he offered information
concerning potential plan amendments that had reached the
level of serious consideration. However, this simple affirmative
statement belies the complexity of the Fischer II test and its
slippery hold on the truths which it requires a plan
administrator to disclose. A negative statement of the Fischer II
test is more revealing. A plan administrator's duty to
communicate truthfully is also discharged if he does not offer
information concerning plan amendments that have failed the
three-factor test for serious consideration. Stated differently,
Fischer II also offers a road map to a safe zone in which
employers may consider significant plan changes without
89 994 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1993).
90 Id. at 135-36.
91 Fischer II, 96 F.3d at 1539.
92 Id.
93 Id. The Fischer II test has not been adopted in all circuits. See, e.g., Ballone v.
Eastman Kodak, 109 F.3d 117, 125 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that an employer may be
liable for misrepresentations before "serious consideration" occurs); Martinez v.
Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 425 (5th Cir. 2003) (rejecting Fischer II's serious
consideration approach).
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triggering the duty to disclose the potential plan changes to
employees. 94
Consider, for example, the Third Circuit's recent opinion in
Mushalla v. Teamsters Local No. 863 Pension Fund.95 Russell
Mushalla and the other plaintiffs participated in a
multiemployer pension fund that was administered by their
union and management representatives. 96 The plan calculated
benefits by multiplying the participant's years of service by his
rate of contribution. At the time of Mushalla's retirement, the
plan provided that the maximum number of years of service that
could be taken into consideration was thirty.97 In December
1997, Mushalla attended a union meeting during which the
union representative who served as a plan trustee reported that
"the Fund was considering an increase in the cap on years of
service."98 Since the same trustee reported on concerns that were
specific to employees of Pathmark, Mushalla formed the
impression that any revision to the cap on years of service would
apply only to Pathmark employees.99 Over the next several
weeks, Mushalla and several of the other plaintiffs asked another
plan trustee whether the benefit levels would be increased, and
each received a negative answer.100°  The latest of these
conversations took place on December 20, 1997, and the response
was still negative. Mushalla and the other plaintiffs eventually
retired between December 19, 1997 and January 30, 1998.101 In
fact, on December 9, the trustees had directed the plan actuary to
prepare a cost analysis and actuarial study of the impact of the
proposed change on the plan. The actuary prepared the report
during January 1998. On January 20, 1998, the plan trustees
reviewed the actuarial analysis and voted unanimously to
increase benefits effective April 1, 1998.102 The plan
administrator informed the participants of the change by letter
dated February 1, 2002.103
94 Fischer II, 96 F.3d at 1539-40.
95 300 F.3d 391 (3d Cir. 2002).
96 Id. at 393.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 394.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 394-95.
101 Id. at 393.
102 Id. at 395.
103 Id. at 393-95.
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Did the plan trustee breach a fiduciary duty to communicate
truthfully with Mushalla when he said, as late as December 20,
that increased benefits were not under consideration? The court,
applying the Fischer II serious consideration test, said that he
had not. The court conceded Mushalla's observation that specific
"cost-analysis and actuarial work are not always necessary
prerequisites to serious consideration." 10 4  However, in the
Mushalla facts, the court concluded that in the absence of an
analysis of "the financial viability of the increase, there could be
no specific proposal" and, therefore, the first of the Fischer II
factors had not been met. 105 Moreover, the second of the Fischer
II factors required consideration of the "practicalities of
implementation" and, in the opinion of the court, this factor had
not been met at the time Mushalla engaged the plan trustee in
conversation. For the Third Circuit, then, the plan trustee
complied with his fiduciary obligation to answer Mushalla's
questions truthfully when he stated that no benefit increases
were under consideration.
Yet, was this compliant answer also a truthful answer?
Mushalla had asked in plain English whether any changes to
benefits were under consideration. In fact, although the plan
actuary had not yet completed his cost analysis regarding the
proposal, the board had certainly ordered this appraisal by the
time Mushalla posed his questions concerning future benefit
increases. Moreover, the proposed increase in plan benefits
motivated the preparation of the cost analysis, rather than the
reverse. The bald facts of the case suggest that by any plain
interpretation of the English language, the board was indeed
considering a change in benefits and was actively pursuing steps
to determine whether that change should take place. Had truth
been the measure of the fiduciary's duty, the only response to
Mushalla's question would be an unequivocal yes.
Yet, complying with Fischer If s serious consideration test
only required the plan fiduciaries to reveal this when the Fischer
II factors had been met. The Fischer II test suggests that the
difference between a discussion of the increase in benefits and a
"serious consideration" of a potential plan amendment is
primarily a difference of degree. The Fischer II test, as applied in
104 Id. at 399.
105 Id. at 399-400.
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Mushalla, gauges the duty of the fiduciary to respond
affirmatively to questions concerning changes in benefits
according to the extent to which the proposal has traveled on a
continuum from discussion to enactment. While it might be
pragmatic to program the fiduciary's duty to respond as a
function of where the proposal is when the employee asks a
question, this is a very different exercise from determining what
is the truthful answer. Fischer II and its progeny teach that the
fiduciary's duty is to communicate affirmatively regarding
benefit proposals that have traveled far enough along this road to
meet the three factors suggesting "serious consideration." Given
the Third Circuit's interpretation of a fiduciary's duty under
ERISA, it is difficult to fault the Mushalla court for supporting
the fiduciary in his negative response.
What might Mushalla look like if the plan fiduciaries had
aspired to a decision that gave human dignity priority over the
employer's profit-maximizing goals? An independent fiduciary
might have been sufficiently distant from the discussions
concerning early retirement windows to be able to separate the
employer's needs for stable staffing against the probability that
the plans concerning the retirement window would be
implemented. Moreover, if the normative goals of Laborem
Exercens had weighed upon an independent fiduciary (or,
possibly, even by a fiduciary with ties to the union or
management), the importance of the subjective dimension of the
participant's work experience might have encouraged the
fiduciaries to give a more fulsome answer even if that answer
exceeded the minimum required by the Fischer II test. Surely,
human dignity is best served by permitting employees to
comprehend and act upon the possibility that their jobs might be
eliminated.
CONCLUSION
ERISA includes many excellent features to safeguard the
interest of participants in an employee benefit plan. It is true
that the design of a plan document is a settlor function, rather
than a fiduciary task, and that fiduciaries are constrained to act
in accordance with the plan documents. Likewise, it does not
necessarily follow that an employer's decision to act as the
fiduciary of his own plan will force him to violate ERISA's
requirements for the conduct of fiduciary business. However, an
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employer's decision to serve as the fiduciary of its own plan may
also cast an impermissibly heavy burden on his fiduciary actions.
True, the two-hat rule does reduce the expenditures associated
with appointing an independent fiduciary; but allowing an
employer to appoint himself as a fiduciary is not the only way to
reduce the costs of plan administration. 106 But the decision to
wear both hats leaves open the possibility that an employer
either mistakenly or intentionally will conflate his
responsibilities when he undertakes the fiduciary responsibilities
inherent in the investment of plan assets or the task of
communicating to employees. Such confusion may prove costly to
the participants and, if challenged through litigation, may
likewise prove costly to the employer, both in terms of financial
considerations and in terms of the human investment in his
relationship with his employees. The appointment of an
independent fiduciary permits a clear delineation between settlor
interests and fiduciary functions.
Consider an image that, with respect to John Paul II, is not
at all improbable. What if a man such as the late Pope worked in
a quarry with the sincere desire to fulfill the objective dimension
of work by complying with the employer's production goals?
What if he also was attentive to and affirmed by his subjective
experience of this work as a means of enhancing his knowledge of
himself as a human person and of his relationship to God. Does a
man like this deserve to have his retirement savings
administered by trustees who use his pension funds to build a
hotel in a place recommended by a physician who had no
experience in construction or the hotel industry? Does a man like
this deserve to hear a plan fiduciary lie about the future
prospects for his employment or benefits?
No, he doesn't. And it's not because he's the Pope. It might
be because ERISA says that these fiduciaries should act in his
sole interest, as he is the plan participant. But, the reasons
emerge in a much more basic and much less ambiguous sense if
we go back to John Paul II's understanding of workplace
relations: "[Tihe basis for determining the value of human work
106 1 am indebted to the panelists and audience members at the March 2006
Employee Benefits Symposium sponsored by the John Marshall Law Review for
pointing out that, for example, the pooling of resources by small employers might
permit one independent fiduciary to provide cost-effective service to a variety of
small employer plans.
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is not primarily the kind of work being done, but the fact that the
one who is doing it is a person."'10 7 This man, like each of us,
deserves a fiduciary who acts in an upright manner because the
value of his work comes from the fact that he is a person, created
in the image and likeness of God.
107 LABOREMEXERCENS, supra note 4, T 6; see also id. 1 26.
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APPENDIX
FIGURE 1 - WORKPLACE COMPENSATION SYSTEM
(INDEPENDENT FIDUCIARY, PROFIT-MAXIMIZING)
Employer sets wages, appoints fiduciaries, determines plan
contributions, sets product pricing.
Employee performs services, determines plan contributions (if
permitted or required).
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FIGURE 2 - WORKPLACE COMPENSATION SYSTEM
(INDEPENDENT FIDUCIARY, PROFIT-MAXIMIZING)
Employer sets wages, appoints fiduciaries, determines plan
contributions, sets product pricing.
Employee performs services, determines plan contributions (if
permitted or required)
Product
nplinoympoyeeApatt
Contributionts Contributionsn
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FIGURE 3 - WORKPLACE COMPENSATION SYSTEM
(TwO-HAT FIDUCIARY, PROFIT-MAXIMIZING)
Employer sets wages, appoints self (or employee) as fiduciary,
determines plan contributions, sets product pricing, administers
plans.
Employee performs services, determines plan contributions (if
permitted or required)
\Pro~ductA
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FIGURE 4 - WORKPLACE COMPENSATION IN VIEW
OF SUBJECTIVE / OBJECTIVE DIMENSIONS OF WORK;
SHARED UNDERSTANDING OF IMPORTANCE
OF SUBJECTIVE DIMENSION OF WORK
